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Abstract: The dominant Shi‟i gender discourse has undergone major shifts in recent years, 
resulting in revisions of various jurisprudential rulings on women‟s rights and status. 
Among such shifts, there have been rulings on female authority, particularly women‟s right 
to access political decision-making positions. Despite being a controversial topic that has 
historically faced much clerical debate and disagreement, in recent years a number of 
reformist clerics have argued in favor of women‟s leadership, which is considered a radical 
departure from the conventional stance. While there are a number of reasons that have 
contributed to these modernist clerical views in recent years, I argue that the most 
significant is women‟s demands and mobilization for reform of misogynist Shari„a-based 
laws. Through reference to clerical gender discourses unfolding in Iran, a Shi‟i state, this 
work will shed light onto the modernist clerical discourses that resulted from women‟s 
strategic and organized pressuring for enhanced women‟s political representation. In this 
regard, this work will examine the interactions between women‟s groups and religious 
elites, in particular pious women‟s efforts to publicize and politicize the issue of female 
authority and women‟s access to leadership positions within the Iranian society, as well as 
the various types of justifications offered by Shi‟i clerics for enhancing women‟s political 
rights. By analyzing the recent clerical reformist discourses, this article identifies two 
dominant types of justifications used by such clerics in explaining the shift from the 
conventional stand on the subject of female authority, which are categorized as a 
contextual rereading and a feminist rereading. This analysis will conclude by evaluating 
the impact of these different types of clerical responses on the future prospects of reform in 
the society, especially democratization of religious interpretation.  
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Historically, Muslim jurists have never reached a consensus on the notion of female authority, 
understood as women‟s access to decision-making or leadership positions, ranging from judgeship to 
presidency or imamate. Within dominant Shi‟i religious thought, the conventional stance has been that 
women are banned from positions of religious and political authority. This type of exclusion was often 
justified through clerical reference to Islamic texts which alluded to women‟s inferiority and 
incapability for leadership or judgeship positions. The majority of Shi‟i scholars, similar to their Sunni 
counterparts, have historically emphasized women‟s roles within the private sphere, while considering 
the public or the political sphere as a male domain [1,2]. In the modern context, this clerical stance was 
further reinforced in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, which established a 
theocracy that brought prominent Shi‟i clerics to power while also adopted various democratic 
features, resulting in an Islamic Republic. The Islamization that followed enacted policies that 
impacted women‟s rights, including hindering their access to key political decision-making positions. 
However, Iranian women have continuously challenged this traditionalist interpretation through 
women-centered rereading of religious texts; and have at times worked with in the limited democratic 
structures of the country to demand increased women‟s representation in politics. In recent times, 
women‟s demands for reform have resulted in more liberal and reformist interpretations concerning 
notions of female authority in which few religious leaders have shown an inclination to reconsider 
their traditionalist position. It is the purpose of this article to outline the major reasons that have 
contributed to these recent shifts, with particular emphasis on the role of women‟s strategic organizing 
towards addressing women‟s political underrepresentation, as well as the clerical responses to such 
mobilization. Hence, the key questions that this work will address are: Why is the issue of female 
authority increasingly becoming the subject of much clerical discourse (or what are the factors that 
encourage Shi‟i clerics to address this issue in recent times)? What are the strategies of women‟s rights 
advocates to bring about such religious reforms? And what is the impact of these reforms on 
democratization of clerical interpretation of religious doctrines, particularly in the area of women‟s 
rights and status?  
This article will address these questions through using Iran as a case study, since the country‟s 
transformation from a secular to a theocratic state as well as its more recent rise in religious 
reformism, provides us with a suitable instance to analyze and track the negotiations and interactions 
that occur between key actors concerning gender roles [3,4]. In my examination, I have divided this 
article into three parts. In the following section I provide a historical analysis of women‟s status and 
organizing since the Islamic Revolution. In the third section, through reviewing a number of primary 
sources, such as Iranian women‟s journals, organizational reports, clerical publications, and secondary 
sources, I will present a narrative of the various demands made by influential groups of Iranian women 
as well as their strategies for accessing political decision-making positions in recent years. This section 
draws attention to the main actors who campaigned for women‟s increased levels of political 
representation, while recognizing that their demands have evolved over the last three decades and have 
been raised by various groups and individuals who may not always see eye to eye. In these 
discussions, I particularly highlight the role played by a number of pious women‟s rights activists who 
publicized and promoted women‟s increased access to political positions using a religious discourse 




and demanded institutional reforms within the state structure. This section will be followed by an 
analysis of the modern Shi‟i discourses on female authority through examining the discourses of two 
influential Iranian reformist clerics, and their impact on future gender discourses. In this regard, I will 
analyze the significance of the recent shifts in clerical attitudes concerning female authority given their 
impact on official state discourse on female authority, women‟s rights to access key political decision-
making positions, as well as on overall religious reform and democratization of religious 
interpretation. 
The central argument of this work is that the major shifts on notions of female authority in recent 
Iranian Shi‟i thought have been the result of the discourses launched by feminists, proponents of 
gender equality, and various reformists. These demands, which took place in the public sphere, 
involved questioning the religious authorities who were occupying the top positions of the state 
pyramid, on their reasoning for denying women‟s access to positions of authority, and pressuring for 
reforms. Today, notions of female authority are hotly debated in the theocratic regime as various 
Iranian women‟s groups and movements, who are armed with modernist arguments as advanced by 
reformist or liberal clerics, continue to pressure both state and society for enhancement of women‟s 
political rights. Hence, women‟s actions and challenges have forced Shi‟a clerics to respond and 
modify some aspects of classical Shi„i law that relate to women‟s leadership roles, though the clerical 
approaches to such reforms have differed in two central ways, namely, the contextual and feminist 
approaches of rereading of religious texts, as will be explained below. In this regard, I argue that 
women‟s activism has not only shed light onto the lack of consensus among religious leaders on this 
issue, but has also given rise to reformist discourses that enhance women‟s access to positions of 
authority. Such shifts, negotiations, and responses of the theocratic regime, deserve further scholarly 
attention, as they illustrate that Islamic jurisprudence on women‟s rights and status are not written in 
stone, and can be subject to internal criticism and eventual change, given effective pressuring and 
organizing (formally and informally) from key actors, particularly domestic women‟s movements [5]. I 
will end the article by evaluating the impact of the continuation of women‟s negotiations with the 
clerical authority on democratization of religious interpretation. I will point to a minority of reformist 
clerics who acknowledge that the conventional clerical stands regarding female authority were 
misinterpretations. This acknowledgement in turn limits the clerical monopoly over interpretation and 
enables for multiplicity of voices, including women‟s own voices.  
2. Women’s Organizing in Post-Revolutionary Iran 
Women‟s political participation, understood as exercising the right to elect or be elected into a 
political position, as well as engaging in other activities that influence politics and its structures, is a 
significant aspect of women‟s public presence. Women‟s active participation in the political sphere as 
citizens enables them to voice their needs and demands and influence or shape their political realities. 
There is a direct linkage between women‟s access to the public sphere and their right to participate in 
politics, since for centuries women were barred (and continue to be barred in some states) from the 
right to vote as they were considered to be ignorant of the social realities of their times. The patriarchal 
state or its elites often justified the ban on women‟s right to vote by declaring that women are out of 
the public sphere, which in turn negatively impacts their knowledge of politics or the realities of their 




time [6,7]. Further, it was emphasized that the women‟s male guardians, such as their fathers and 
husbands, can voice their needs and demands by voting on their behalf. However, such justification 
lost ground as increasing amounts of women, beginning with those who were educated and 
knowledgeable of their political surroundings, pushed for the right to vote. In this sense, a gap was 
realized between women‟s capabilities and the laws of the patriarchal state. Gradually reforms were 
undertaken to increase women‟s status in the public sphere. However, this process is still evolving and 
to this day not complete.  
Women‟s gross underrepresentation in politics is illustrated by the fact that although women 
constitute at least half of the world‟s population, they are currently represented by only about 19 percent 
of female parliamentarians worldwide [8]. Women‟s underrepresentation tends to be even more 
pronounced in Muslim-majority countries, in which on average women constitute roughly 12.5 percent 
of total parliamentarians [8]. Iran is no exception to this trend and despite having granted women the 
right to vote in 1963, today women constitute only 2.8 percent of the total parliamentarians which is a 
drop from the 7 percent that was reached right before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In addition to 
women‟s marginal presence in the national parliament, Iranian women have also faced limited access 
to other decision-making positions, ranging from the presidency, to ministerial positions, and even 
positions of judgeship [9]. For instance, Shirin Ebadi, the first Muslim woman to have received the 
Nobel Peace Prize, was stripped of her judgeship position after the revolution due to a conservative 
interpretation that declared women‟s judgeship as un-Islamic [10].  
A majority of such limitations were put in place at the time of the drafting of the 1979 Iranian 
Constitution, which not only declared maleness as a prerequisite for various religious and political 
leadership positions (at times overtly), but also emphasized women‟s private roles as mothers and 
wives through adopting a notion of complementarity in gender rights and duties [11]. The discourse of 
complementarity between men and women was championed by Ayatollah Morteza Mutahhari, a key 
formulator of the Islamic regime‟s gender discourse. According to this view, women‟s and men‟s 
gender roles and duties are different (but complementary) as prescribed by “nature”. Woman‟s primary 
role is to satisfy her domestic duties for which she is psychologically and physically built, while man‟s 
is to protect his family and society due to his rationality and strength [1]. Furthermore, threatening this 
balance of complementarity among sexes leads to chaos in the Islamic society. For instance, pressuring 
or encouraging women to enter the public sphere without first satisfying their divine duties of 
motherhood and wifehood, threatens the institution of family, and therefore the Islamic society as a 
whole, since the family is its basic unit [12]. Hence, other rulings of the Islamic regime that barred 
women‟s participation included limiting women‟s employment, and adopting policies of veiling and 
gender segregation within the public sphere [13,14].  
However, this conservative clerical stance ignored the historical instances of Muslim women in 
positions of religious and political authority [15], as well as the diversity of clerical views on women‟s 
rights and status. As the new Iranian constitution was being drafted in 1979, the most conservative 
clerical voices monopolized power in their own hands and as a result prioritized their interpretations 
concerning family and gender relations over more liberal ones. Ironically, while diversity and 
disagreement (ikhtilaf) among clerics was considered acceptable and even welcomed in a Muslim 
community, Iran‟s Islamization process in the aftermath of the revolution attempted to present a 
uniform clerical position through codification. This major shift particularly holds true regarding female 




authority. For instance, although prior to the revolution various Shi‟i clerics supported female 
judgeship or even helped train female mujtahids, or Muslim jurists who are qualified to interpret the 
law through ijtihad or independent reasoning, such as Banu Amin Isfahani; immediately after the 
revolution, the dominant clerical position banned women from judgeship and discouraged them from 
reaching the authoritative level of ijtihad [16]. In fact, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic 
Republic, declared that women cannot serve as judges in an attempt to highlight the conservative 
nature of the new theocratic regime and to depart from more liberal interpretations [17]. This ban 
served to curtail women‟s access to other positions of religious and political authority in early post-
revolutionary Iran since it was often cited as a justification for declaring women unfit for decision-
making or leadership positions in general [2].  
Yet, despite the fact that the official gender discourse of the Islamic state rendered women to the 
private sphere and granted them a lower societal status, Iranian women, who had realized their 
political potential during the revolution, could not be easily marginalized. Indeed, according to various 
scholars women‟s political rights could not be revoked by the Islamic government due to women‟s 
mobilization during the revolution and their significance as a voting bloc for the new regime [14]. In 
this sense, even the conservative voices that often emphasized women‟s domestic duties over their 
public presence, realized the need to be legitimated by the large groups of mobilized and politically 
conscious women, many of whom had played a key role in overthrowing the monarchy. Hence, as an 
important political move, Ayatollah Khomeini, who was himself an outspoken critic of female suffrage 
when it was granted by the previous regime in 1963 by declaring it “un-Islamic,” shifted his position 
in 1979 by supporting women‟s political rights [9,13]. In fact, he publicly encouraged women to 
participate in politics and vote for the Islamic regime, not because they have the right to, but because it 
is their duty as stated by Shari‟a [9,18]. He further maintained that women could participate in politics 
by voting even without the permission of their husbands [1].  
Therefore, Iranian women as important political actors refused to accept their exclusion from 
important positions within the public sphere, particularly given the regime‟s early promises of Islamic 
justice and equality [19,20]. Various women‟s groups and movements were organized across the 
political and ideological spectrum, and each began to develop strategies to bring questions of gender 
justice and equality into the public discourse. In particular, pious women, who were marginalized by 
the monarchy and later felt betrayed by the Islamic regime, began to equip themselves with the 
necessary tools to undermine patriarchal rulings and practices. The primary tools that assisted them in 
their efforts were diversity of opinions among clerics on women‟s issues (especially the liberal clerical 
views), women‟s high levels of education and political consciousness, as well as their access to key 
religious figures and institutions. After a decade of experiencing life under an Islamic regime, various 
groups of pious women began to protest what they felt were patriarchal misinterpretations of religious 
texts that denied them their legitimate Islamic rights. These organized groups‟ main strategy of 
pushing for reform was to publicize the contradictory views of the religious authorities in women‟s 
magazines and other media outlets, and in a way hold the ulema accountable to their earlier promises 
of Islamic justice.  
Eventually a religious women‟s movement developed in Iran which consisted of various religious 
women‟s groups and organizations. A majority of the members of this movement were devout 
Muslims who supported the Islamic Republic (though to different degrees), and sought to advance 




women‟s rights through a religious, rather than secular, framework [20,21]. Interestingly, by the early-
1990s, even those women who had once subscribed to the notions of complementarity of rights at the 
time of the revolution began to seriously challenge them by arguing that there is no inherent or logical 
link between patriarchy and Islamic ideals [21,22]. Yet, instead of abandoning religion or the regime‟s 
revolutionary ideals, these women choose to work within the existing political structure by publicly 
pressuring the clerics to reform various legislations and practices which they felt were discriminatory. 
Throughout such pressuring and campaigns for reform, pious women particularly took advantage of 
the diversity of opinions among clerics and strategically publicized and emphasize the most liberal and 
women-friendly voices. These groups of women‟s rights activists and their interactions and 
negotiations with reformist and liberal minded clerics gave rise to “new religious thought” (now-
andishi-ye dini), which sought to bridge the gap between religious and secular intellectuals by 
adopting a pragmatic and flexible approach towards religious doctrines on democracy, freedom and 
human rights. The central argument of new religious thinkers were that “human understanding of 
Islam is flexible in that Islam‟s tenets can be interpreted to encourage pluralism and democracy, and 
that Islam allows change in the face of time, space, and experience [22].” Pious women‟s journals, 
such as Zanan (women) and Payam-e Hajar (Hajar‟s message), provided these intellectuals with a 
platform to publicize their stands on gender roles and women‟s rights, including women‟s access to 
key political decision-making positions, an issue which become a central demand of the Iranian 
women‟s movement. 
As a result, I argue that many pious women, particularly those who have been fervent supports of 
the Islamic regime and its ideals, have been at the forefront of opening avenues for women‟s political 
representation. This has been partly due to the fact that some of the members of the religious women‟s 
movement were themselves learned women from the seminaries or daughters and wives of influential 
clerical figures. This insider position not only provided these pious women with unique opportunities 
to access key positions or pressure influential individuals, but also legitimized their demands for 
gender equality and female authority in the eyes of the ruling elites as genuine rather than western 
inspired. Many of these women make their claims through religion by arguing that gender equality is 
inherent in Islam but denied to them by the patriarchal misinterpretations. Hence, in an effort to further 
empower themselves, many pious women in Iran have been advocating women-centered re-reading 
and reinterpretation of religious texts. Indeed, the number of women‟s religious training centers has 
spread in recent years, to the extent that from merely five after the revolution, today there are more 
than 270 schools across Iran, many of which train female theologians and mujtahids with the objective 
of guiding other women in the religious ideals and values of the Islamic state [16,23], and gaining 
religious authority.  
While there are instances of reformist and women-friendly re-interpretations of religious texts 
throughout Islam‟s history, Iran‟s pious women‟s rights activists fuse their religiously inspired 
demands with the modernist discourses of social justice and human rights [21]. Concerning women‟s 
access to political leadership positions, the women-centered re-reading of religious texts and traditions 
involves revival of women‟s voices and activities in early Islam that were lost through patriarchal 
interpretations and cultural influence. In this regard, the re-interpreters emphasize a number of 
instances of early Muslim women who were active in some way in the public sphere, or the Qura‟nic 
verses that establish gender equality. Such instances include the important roles that Aisha, Fatima or 




Zeinab (the Prophet‟s relatives) played in early Islam as public figures, speakers, fighters, hadith 
transmitters, and Quran interpreters [24,25]; as well as a number of Qura‟nic verses that tell the story 
of the successful Queen of Sheeba (Bilqis) or emphasize gender equality. Significantly, the Qur‟an‟s 
account of Queen of Sheeba, the only queen mentioned in the Qur‟an, tells the story of a thoughtful 
and just leader, who after consulting with her counsel makes the rightful decision of meeting with 
King Solomon and accepting to worship his creator, Allah [26]. 
To better illustrate the actions and strategies of pious women‟s rights advocates and religious 
reformists, I will outline their campaigns and efforts for enhancing women‟s access to different 
positions of authority within the Iranian state structure, namely the office of the presidency, ministerial 
positions, and the Council of Experts, a body which requires its members to have high levels of 
religious authority. Lastly, I will discuss the reformist clerical voices that have emerged due to 
women‟s campaigning and activism, particularly the two dominant reformist approaches of justifying 
women‟s access to positions of authority. 
3. Iranian Women’s Demands and Strategies for Accessing Political Decision-Making Positions 
Among the first areas that women protested having limited access to, was the presidency. Although 
Iranian women considered having a share in decision-making to be one of their legitimate claims given 
their activism during the revolution, the formulators of the new constitution thought otherwise. In 
accordance with their traditional interpretations of religious doctrines that prioritized women‟s 
domestic roles, the majority male drafters of the 1979 constitution (only one female member, Monireh 
Gorji, was present among a total of 73 members), advocated entering a requirement of maleness for the 
position of the president in article 115 of the new Iranian constitution [14]. This move however faced 
the opposition of a number of drafters who advocated replacing the requirement for “maleness” with 
the more ambiguous term of “rijal,” which can be understood either as “men” or as a gender neutral 
term of “personalities”. The term rijal technically means men but according to its Arabic usage can 
also be granted to women as honorary men, or in the sense that women can advance to the extent that 
they become like men. This strategic compromise was made in response to the threat of protest of 
Iranian women‟s movement (including many Islamist women) that opposed inclusion of the pre-
requisite of maleness for the office of presidency [27]. The ambiguity of this term went unchallenged 
for almost two decades until 1997, when eight women, including Azam Taleghani, daughter of 
Ayatollah Mohammad Taleghani, announced their intention to campaign for the highest executive 
office. Azam Taleghani as a former member of the Iranian parliament (who had received among the 
highest percentage of popular votes ever casted for a parliamentarian) and a learned woman who was 
educated in religious seminaries [28], ran for this office in an attempt to challenge the ambiguous term 
of “rijal” in the Iranian constitution. As she later publicized in her journal, Payam-e Hajar, Taleghani 
sought the clarification of this contentious term from the Council of Guardians, a body that vets the 
qualification of registered candidates for most popular elections and consists of six clerics and six 
jurists [29].  
However, Azam Taleghani‟s strategic registration of her candidacy in 1997 did not result in a 
clarification from the Council, who in the end disqualified all of the female candidates, but without 
mentioning their gender as a reason for their disqualification. In fact, the Council of Guardians 




disqualifies the candidacy of many applicants, regardless of gender, without providing any 
explanations for its decisions, despite a demand from various moderate politicians that the Council 
give legal reason for disqualification of candidates. The Council has rejected the requirement to 
provide written explanations for disqualified candidates by arguing that it is against religious law and 
might harm a person‟s reputation or threaten national security [30]. This aspect of the Council‟s 
functioning has been challenged and declared undemocratic since even incumbents or those whose 
candidacy was approved in previous elections can also be disqualified by the Council without an 
explanation, and hence unable to appeal the decision [30]. However, it can be argued that the Council 
is unlikely to approve the qualification of female candidates due to its conservative tendency. In 
response to such silence, Taleghani made yet another bold move to continue her pressure for reforms. 
Following her disqualification she took it upon herself to interview a number of Shi‟i clerics on their 
opinions concerning female political authority as well as their interpretation of the term “rijal” as it 
appears in the constitution as a requirement for presidency. She then published these interviews in her 
journal Payam-e Hajar, in an effort to bring this debate into the public sphere and in turn increase the 
pressure on Iran‟s political and religious elites. By outlining the contradictory clerical views on the 
notion of female authority in Shi‟i Islam, Taleghani successfully illustrated the lack of consensus that 
exists among Iran‟s religious leaders, while also emphasizing her own stance (as a learned Muslim 
woman) that there is no contradiction between women‟s political leadership and Islam [29].  
This move encouraged more female presidential candidates to register in future elections since they 
understood the Council‟s silence on the issue of their gender as reason to further challenge male 
political hierarchy. Consequently, from merely eight, the number of women aspiring for presidential 
candidacy rose drastically to 47 and 89 for the 2001 and 2005 election years respectively, but fell to 42 
for the 2009 elections [31-33]. At all of these elections, the Council never approved a single female 
candidate, despite their religious and political qualifications, while it never referred to the candidate‟s 
gender as a reason for the disqualification. Different groups of Iranian women, particularly those who 
had links to the Islamic regime, did not merely tolerate these extensive disqualifications and further 
pressured the Council, as well as other clerical elites, to clarify their interpretation of the term “rijal”, 
mostly through women‟s journals. It was not until the 2009 presidential elections, that the Council for 
the first time declared that it interpreted this qualification in gender neutral terms, and it vetted the 
candidates merely based on their qualifications. When Abass-Ali Kadkhodayi, the spokesman for the 
Council of Guardians, was asked in a press conference shortly before the 2009 elections about whether 
there have been any changes on the Council‟s interpretation of the term “rijal” in its consideration of 
female candidates, he responded by staying that: 
“The Council (itself) has never interpreted the term “political rijal”. All that has thus far been 
mentioned (about this issue) has been from the media and legal bodies. The stance of the Council of 
Guardians has not changed. In the past female candidates registered to run for president as there is 
no specific limitation on the matter... The Council of Guardians has never arrived at its position 
based on an individual‟s gender, and whenever a woman was not qualified (to become a 
presidential candidate) it was because she lacked the necessary qualifications [34,35].”  
This statement was yet another example of a major shift in the discourse of the regime on the topic 
of female authority, since in the previous presidential elections of 2005, the then spokesman of the 




Council, Gholam-Hossein Elham, clarified that the Council interpreted the term rijal in its literal 
meaning that is the male gender [35]. Nonetheless, Kadkhodayi‟s words in 2009, which came less than 
a month before the five-day candidate registration period, were widely publicized by different 
women‟s groups as they believed the current spokesman‟s words removed an institutional hindrance, 
at least in intention. This shift in the Council‟s rhetoric can partly also explain the drop in the number 
of registered female presidential hopefuls from 89 in 2005 to only 42 in 2009, as some women‟s 
groups considered it a victory and saw no need to further register as a pressuring strategy. On the other 
hand, other groups argued that had the Council once again defined the term rijal in gender-specific 
terms, it would have provided women with an opportunity to further dispute this stance in public. Yet 
despite these developments, key pious women‟s rights advocates continue to pressure and lobby for 
the approval of female candidates for the presidency, as many consider that actions of the Council 
speaks much louder than mere statements or press releases. For instance, Mrs. Touran Valimorad, the 
Secretary of Coalition of Islamic Women, considers the statements of the Council‟s spokesman as 
inadequate and states that, “rather than the spokesperson making these remarks, the Council should 
officially declare that women are able to become presidential hopefuls and act accordingly.” [44].  
Nevertheless, the Council of Guardian‟s eventual clarification of this contentious term demonstrates 
the extent of women‟s strategic efforts and pressuring on state elites, as well as some of the pressuring 
and negotiations that occurred between the religious women‟s groups and various reformist clerical 
figures. As will be illustrated in the following section, the reformist clerical voices have been playing a 
key role in assisting women‟s efforts to enhance their access to key political decision-making 
positions. Pious women‟s rights activists tactfully publicized the negotiations between clerics and 
women‟s demands in women‟s journals, which in effect provided a public platform for reformist 
clerics who favored reform of Islamic rulings that barred women‟s participation. In this regard, a 
number of liberal-minded clerics challenged the traditional rulings on female authority, and instead 
advocated reform in terms of modern contexts and women‟s realities. I argue that such pressures from 
below not only led to the popularization of the issue of female authority, but also to the eventual rise of 
various reformist clerical voices that approved women‟s access to political decision-making positions.  
The late-1990s witnessed increased organizing on different levels concerning women‟s status 
within an Islamic society. Different Iranian women‟s groups and organizations, religious and secular 
alike, continued to strategize to enhance women‟s access to additional political decision-making 
positions other than the presidency, including ministerial positions. A significant political opportunity 
that presented itself for increasing women‟s political presence was the election of reformist President 
Khatami in 1997, who won with a landslide in a large part due to women‟s vote [17,36]. Khatami, 
himself a cleric, recognized many of women‟s demands and effectively mobilized their support by 
integrating them into his campaign promises. Among such promises were women‟s demands for 
increased representation in key political positions. Indeed, one of his publicized beliefs was that “the 
Islamic system and community should confidently appoint women to sensitive posts … Limitations 
should not come in the way of broad participation by women in management, politics and society” 
(quoted in [36]). Many women along with other reformists were hopeful that Khatami would nominate 
women for ministerial positions. In fact, “one hundred sixty-three reformist members of the Sixth 
parliament signed an official letter expressing this expectation” [37]. 




However, despite these promises and women‟s expectations for increased levels for women‟s 
political representation during his presidency, particularly appointment of at least a female minister, 
Khatami, similar to the regime‟s former presidents did not appoint any female ministers to either one 
of his cabinets in 1997 or 2001. His only notable move was to include two women in his cabinet, and 
appointed Masumeh Ebtekar as the Vice President on environment and women‟s issues, and Zahra 
Shojai as his advisor and director of the Center for Women‟s Participation, which is part of the 
President‟s office. Once again, pious women‟s rights activists did not remain silent in the face of this 
defeat, and in response held a press conference with Khatami and the women in his cabinet, 
demanding an explanation from him for not appointing a single female minister despite being provided 
with lists from religious women‟s groups and organizations of qualified women‟s names that can serve 
as ministers. Similar, to Taleghani‟s tactic of publicizing the elites‟ responses, these women‟s rights 
activists also printed Khatami‟s responses in a women‟s journal (Zanan) after questioning him on this 
issue. To women‟s great dismay, Khatami is quoted as saying “selection of a female minister is not 
necessary, and I couldn‟t risk appointing a woman as minister” [38]. He further used the neo-
traditionalist rhetoric of meritocracy (Shayestegrayee), by emphasizing women‟s qualities for political 
office over all else, and argued that there is a lack of qualified female candidates for these posts. In the 
same interview, Khatami credited himself as being the only president of the Islamic Republic who has 
included women in his cabinet, by stating that “position of a vice president is similar to being a 
minister, with the difference that she is not subject to Parliament‟s questioning on her performance, 
rather the president is questioned” [38]. The journal also presented key women‟s responses to 
Khatami‟s comments, including Jamileh Kadivar, a female parliamentarian who received the second 
highest percentage of popular votes in her constituency. Kadivar raises issue with Khatami‟s equation 
of selecting female ministers to a political “risk,” by emphasizing that we cannot reform our society 
without first reforming our discriminatory practices [38]. 
Recognizing themselves as political agents, women did not cease their efforts for further reforms 
even with the reformist loss in the 2005 elections that brought conservative President Ahmadinejad to 
power. In fact, women‟s pressures intensified with every presidential election, and their strategic 
organizing led to creation of a coalition prior to the 2009 presidential elections that brought together 
many women‟s groups and individual activists across a wide spectrum, ranging from secular and 
liberal to religious and conservative women [37]. This coalition, called the Convergence of Women 
(hamgarayee zanan), played a key role in pressuring the presidential candidates to announce their 
plans for the advancement of Iranian women‟s status, while also unifying women‟s voices in terms of 
their demands and expectations from the new administration.  
Ironically, the first ever nomination of female ministers in the history of the Islamic Republic did 
not come from a reformist president, but from Ahmadinejad, who in his second term in 2009 
nominated three women for parliament‟s approval as ministers of health, social welfare and education. 
In the end, the parliament approved the nomination of only one of the female nominees with 175 votes 
from a total of 286, and Ms. Marzieh Vahid Dastjerdi became the minister of health. This success is 
primarily credited to the pressuring and lobbying efforts of a conservative religious women‟s 
organization called Zeinab Society, which provided Ahmadinejad with a list of names of potential 
women for ministerial positions, among which was Vahid Dastjerdi‟s name [37].  




However, this approval was not without controversy, as Ahmadenejad‟s nomination of female 
candidates faced opposition from many conservative clerics, and amplified the division among Iran‟s 
clerics. Conservatives responded negatively to the “innovative idea to choose women as ministers” by 
emphasizing that there are “religious uncertainties” about women in managerial positions [39]. Also 
when Ahmadinejad attempted to fill the remaining empty ministerial positions with two other female 
candidates, the head of the Parliament‟s Clerics‟ Faction, Mohammad-Taqi Rahbar, responded that “as 
a number of ulema oppose nomination of women for post of minister, I believe that the administration 
should not insist on the issue” [40]. He further stated that the parliament approved the nominee for the 
ministry of health “because it wanted to meet the president‟s goal to have a women minister in his 
cabinet” [40]. This particular response of Rahbar was to downplay the female minister‟s qualifications 
for the post, which included decades of political experience as well as serving on managerial boards of 
medical associations and hospitals, by suggesting that the Parliament in fact did the president a favor 
by confirming Vahid Dastjerdi. Such reactions resulted in both women withdrawing their names from 
consideration so as not to offend the conservative clerics, despite their long history of political 
activism in conservative camps [37]. For instance, Fatemeh Alia who was nominated in the second 
round of parliamentary consideration by Ahmadinejad for Iran‟s education minister had more than 20 
years of experience in education, and was a conservative member of the parliament [40]. 
The nomination and approval of a female minister had significant implications for notions of female 
authority in contemporary Shi‟i thought, Iranian factional politics, and women‟s organizing tactics. 
This process, by involving clerics, various women‟s groups, as well as political elites, once again 
initiated a discussion on whether women should have access to political decision-making positions. 
The most significant gain from this process for women‟s groups was a „green light‟ that they received 
concerning women‟s political authority from the highest religious authority in Iran, the Supreme 
Leader. This victory came about when high ranking women of the Islamic regime strategically sought 
the approval of Ayatollah Khamenei, on the subject of women ministers. Hence, despite massive 
pressures from conservative clerics on Marzieh Vahid Dastjerdi to resign her candidacy, Zeinab 
Society‟s director, Maryam Behroozi, lobbied Ayatollah Khamenei‟s office as well as his key 
supporters on supporting Dastjerdi‟s access to this powerful position, including a coalition of fourteen 
conservative groups titled the Front of the Followers of the Imam and the (Supreme) Leader [44,45]. 
After such lobbying campaigns, various conservative women officials publicized the favorable 
comments of the Leader on the subject matter [37]. 
In addition, once Dastjerdi‟s nomination for the post of health minister was finally approved by the 
parliament, instead of simply accepting it, she herself also paid a visit to Ayatollah Khamenei‟s office 
to ensure that he had not issued any statements against the appointment of female ministers. Once she 
received his blessing in this private meeting, Dastjerdi along with other religious women‟s groups, 
decided to publicize it in order to undermine the clerical forces that oppose women‟s political 
leadership, and in a way put an end to the clerical debates on this issue [37]. Needless to say, 
Khamenei‟s approval has been a significant shift in Shi‟i political thought concerning female political 
authority and is regarded by many Iranian women as to have increased women‟s access to other 
important political decision-making positions, despite dispersed clerical opposition. This shift is even 
more significant given Khamenei‟s conservatism, and is a measure of pious women‟s influence and 
clout over even conservative political factions in addition to reformists; and is an indication of the 




extent that even the supreme leader depends on public legitimacy. Additionally, Ahmadinejad‟s radical 
move of nominating female ministers illustrates that male politicians and parties, regardless of political 
ideology, can no longer afford to ignore women as a political constituency, even in Iran‟s limited 
democratic structure [41]. In fact, Ahmadinejad strategically reacted to women‟s groups and their 
organizing efforts by nominating women for minister positions to not only gain women‟s support in 
the aftermath of the 2009 disputed presidential elections, but to also establish his independence from 
various conservative clerical factions [37]. In this regard, the process of appointment of female 
ministers involved strategic interactions between women‟s groups and political elites such as 
Ahmadinejad, both of whom took such political actions to further their interests.  
Therefore, as illustrated, women‟s efforts for accessing political decision-making positions in the 
Islamic Republic have been effective since they often used their limited political rights to pressure the 
elites to react receptively to their demands. Indeed, 2009 witnessed two significant victories for Iranian 
women concerning female political authority. First was that the conservative Council of Guardians 
interpreted the term “rijal” in a gender neutral manner for the first time since the regime‟s foundation, 
and in turn gave its approval of women‟s candidacy for the presidency at least in rhetoric. Second, 
regardless of Ahmadinejad‟s motives, a woman was eventually appointed as a minister with the 
approval of the Supreme Leader, which will undoubtedly enhance women‟s access to other positions 
of authority.  
While women‟s activism mostly surrounded increasing their access to positions of political 
authority, Zeinab Society, as a powerful religious women‟s group, also made the bold move of 
demanding women‟s enhanced access to positions of religious authority. Zeinab Soceity, which also 
functions as a conservative women‟s political party and oversees eight religious seminaries and Qur‟an 
centers, nominated six female mujtahids in 2007 for the historically clerical (and all-male) Assembly 
of Experts [19]. According to law, this 86-member body must be composed of mujtahids who are 
elected popularly for eight-year terms, and are charged with electing or removing the Supreme Leader 
and supervising his activities. Therefore, although maleness is not mentioned as one of the 
requirements for the assembly‟s “experts,” women are assumed to be automatically disqualified as 
there is a lack of consensus among the ulema on whether women can become mujtahids; though a 
majority believe that while a woman can reach this level of knowledge, she can only guide herself or 
be emulated only by other women. However, to the Zeinab Society‟s disappointment, the Council of 
Guardians, which also vets the candidates for election to this body, did not approve the candidacy of 
any of the six female mujtahids, all of whom were considered qualified by the Society. Although, the 
Council of Guardians once again did not provide an explanation for rejecting these women, the 
Society‟s nomination was nonetheless an important move to break the taboo that women cannot 
become religious leaders [19].  
4. Modern Shi’i Discourses on Female Authority  
As the above section illustrated, although Iranian women have been historically marginalized from 
the political sphere by facing various institutional and religious obstacles, they nonetheless consider 
their access to political decision-making as an important channel through which to influence politics 
and eventually advance their status. Women from across the ideological spectrum continuously 




pressured for increased levels of women‟s representation in different governmental positions, though 
in the end the religious women‟s groups, such as Zeinab Society, were more successful in attaining 
their goals, given Iran‟s theocratic political framework and women‟s own levels of religiosity and 
strategic organizing. However, an additional important aspect of the Iranian women‟s success was the 
support that they received from reformist or liberal clerics who provided them with modernist 
arguments in favor of female authority in political and at times religious fields. This support was 
provided to women as many religious clerics and political elites realized that they depend on women‟s 
legitimacy to stay in power. Such arguments, some of which were articulated by the highest ranking 
Shi‟i clerics, not only legitimized women‟s demands but also illustrated that Islamic rulings 
concerning women‟s societal status are changeable according to modern times and contexts. Thus, as a 
result of women‟s strategic publicizing of such liberal clerical interpretations in the Islamic society, we 
are witnessing significant shifts concerning women‟s access to positions of authority, particularly 
since the early years of the revolution in which women were generally considered unfit to rule. Today, 
increasing amounts of clerics consider women‟s political participation and representation to be 
compatible with Islam, an argument which also resonates with the public.  
However, the reformist interpretations that have been on the rise in recent years are dissimilar in 
their reasoning or justifications that they provide for departing from the conventional stance 
concerning female authority. I argue that it is now necessary for us to evaluate the impact of these 
reformist voices and their subtle varieties on democratization initiatives of religious interpretations, 
which have also been a central demand of many rights activists and religious intellectuals. Hence, 
aside from reforming rulings that barred women‟s participation, it is important to also examine the 
extent that Iranian reformist clerics are opening the gate for women‟s own interpretation of religious 
texts by taking into account their own qualifications and experiences. In this section, I will present the 
modern Shi‟i discourses on female authority by referencing a number of clerics who addressed this 
issue, and conclude by analyzing the impact of such reformist clerical voices on future rights discourse 
developments and democratization of religious interpretation. This analysis is even more significant 
regarding Iran‟s gender discourse, since within the country‟s theocratic structure religious figures are 
often also political figures. 
I argue that among the reformist voices, the clerical justification used for the modern shifts from the 
conventional stand falls into two dominant categories. In other words, reformist clerics justify their 
liberal interpretations concerning female authority according to two types of reasoning, each of which 
has a different implication for women and the future prospects of reform in the society. The first 
category which is contextual rereading refers to those Shi‟i reformists who justify the shift on female 
authority through emphasizing contextual and environmental changes. In this regard, they argue that 
the “quality of women” has improved over time, providing them with the necessary skills or 
knowledge to acquire political or religious authority. On the other hand, a group of reformists argue 
that a feminist rereading of the texts is required to correct the conventional position. According to 
this view, previous marginalization of women from the political field was a clerical misinterpretation 
as it ignored the inherent egalitarian message of the Quran. Feminist rereading as initially advocated 
by Islamic feminists, and various scholars such as Riffat Hassan, Asma Barlas, Amina Wadud, and 
Fatima Mernissi, is increasingly gaining ground with a number of such reformists, mostly due to the 
pressures from the domestic women‟s movements. Despite writing from within the Sunni tradition, 




many of these scholars have had major transnational impact on reinterpretation of Islamic rulings on 
gender. In fact, transnational exchanges between Muslim communities have played a key role in the 
spread and authenticity of feminist inspired reinterpretations of Islamic texts. In this regard, feminist 
rereading in Iran cannot be isolated from the larger reformist developments across the Muslim world, 
which further geared Iranian reformists with religiously inspired arguments for gender equality.  
It is important to note that many Shi‟i reformists in Iran use a combination of both contextual and 
feminist rereading as justifications for the recent shifts in support of female authority, often by 
crediting these ideological shifts to women‟s own improvement while acknowledging the patriarchal 
cultural dominance that also negatively impacted women‟s political participation. To better illustrate 
each of these different reformist stands as well as their impact on modern Shi‟i thought on female 
authority I will refer to two popular clerical voices in Iran, namely the rhetoric of former Iranian 
president and mid-ranking cleric Mohammad Khatami, and Ayatollah Yousef Sanei, a renowned Shi‟i 
marja, which is the highest level of religious authority in Shi‟i Islam. Although both of these clerical 
figures are considered modernists with liberal notions on female authority, they depart on their 
justifications for the shift in ideology on enhancing women‟s access to political office. It can be argued 
that the different discourses and language used by these two particular figures reflect their different 
positions within the religious hierarchy and state structure. For instance, Sanei as a marja, has the 
authority to change classical rulings, whereas Khatami, as a lower ranking cleric lacks this authority in 
religious terms, and faced many limitations as a president since he was expected to work within the 
structures of power. Nonetheless, despite these positional differences which undoubtedly influences 
their discourses on female authority, my intentions are to draw attention to the impact of their 
justifications for reform on the public sphere‟s discussions concerning this issue as well as future 
democratization of religious interpretation. In other words, I argue that the justifications used by both 
Khatami and Sanei have a great impact on the gender discourses of the Islamic republic as well as on 
Iranian women and activists who are in search of effective and lasting solutions in addressing women‟s 
political underrepresentation. In this regard, it is also important to keep in mind that even these 
reformist clerics may shift in their ideologies, sometimes becoming more liberal. 
Mohammad Khatami as an influential figure who emerged as the leader of the Iranian reform 
movement had various opportunities to advance women‟s levels of authority in politics, such as 
through nominating women to his cabinet or increasing women‟s candidacy for parliamentary 
reformist party lists. However, he failed to sufficiently address women‟s political underrepresentation 
during his presidency. As mentioned above, Khatami believes that “leadership posts in an Islamic 
society must be granted based on one‟s merit rather than gender” [29]. The rhetoric of meritocracy 
blames women‟s low levels of political representation on women‟s own lack of qualifications, which 
are gradually changing in modern Iran, particularly due to women‟s increasing levels of 
professionalism and activism. Therefore, according to this view contextual shifts such as women‟s 
own advancements led to women gaining the necessary qualifications for political office.  
This viewpoint has various significant implications on the more general aspect of religious 
interpretations and women‟s societal and legal advancement. The major negative implication of this 
position is that it does not contribute to democratization of religious interpretation since it merely 
accommodates the gender perspective of the society without fundamentally altering the conventional 
interpretational framework. This reformist position maintains the clerical establishment's authority 




over declaring women‟s capabilities for leadership by placing the blame for women‟s historical lack of 
power on women themselves. Hence, it justifies women‟s access to authority in modern times through 
women‟s own progress rather than clerical misinterpretations. In other words, this view assumes that 
clerical interpretations that previously considered women as incapable or unqualified for political 
office were correct in their positions, since women themselves lacked these qualities. Such assumptive 
approach places little emphasis on the negative role of culture and various barriers deliberately and by 
design placed on women‟s access to politics, as well as the ever-changing nature of cultures. This 
position also ignores the factors that allowed men to reach the necessary qualifications in comparison 
to women. 
On the other hand, a feminist re-reading which has been articulated by a number of Iranian 
reformists, hold that various patriarchal rulings on women were based on erroneous traditions 
(sonathaye qalat) in which cultural understandings of a particular time were mistakenly interpreted by 
clerics as universal religious mandates. One such cleric is Ayatollah Yousef Saanei, who publicly 
declares that “women are capable of being the Wali al-Faqih (guardian jurist) and that they could lead 
the prayers while the men pray behind them [42].” To this extent, Saanei has also produced a scholarly 
book at the Hawza al Illmiya (religious seminary) in Qom on women‟s jurisprudence, which further 
states that women can hold the office of president, and calls on his other colleagues, Sunni and Shi‟a to 
act in accordance. This outspoken cleric on women‟s rights explains his position through reinterpreting 
Qur‟anic verses and ahadith (sayings and deeds of the Prophet and Shi‟i Imams) that were 
conventionally used to justify a ban on women‟s political or religious authority, rather than 
emphasizing women‟s qualifications in today‟s context. For instance, perhaps the most commonly 
cited argument against female authority is verse 4:34 of the Quran, which according to a traditional 
interpretation it considers men as guardians (quwwamuna) of women (or have authority over them) 
since God has favored one over the other. However, a modernist and feminist interpretation of this 
verse, as presented by Saanei, interprets this term as women‟s “maintainers,” since men are entrusted 
with the financial responsibility to maintain their wives during marriage. This line of interpretation is 
justified since establishing male superiority over women goes against other Qur‟anic verses that 
emphasize gender equality in all aspects of behavior [43]. Two examples of such verses are 3:195 and 
33:35, both of which emphasize the spiritual equality between genders by stating that men and women 
will be rewarded and punished equally based solely on their actions. 
Similar to questioning such patriarchal interpretations that go against the inherent egalitarian 
message of the Qur‟an, feminist-centered interpreters also challenge the ahadith that are used to ban 
women‟s access to positions of leadership. For instance, the ahadith that consider women incapable of 
leadership by declaring them emotional rather than rational, physically and psychologically weak, bad 
managers, unintelligent, selfish, traitorous, and much more, are challenged primarily because they 
oppose Qur‟an‟s message of gender equality. Other Shi‟i scholars declare many of these ahadith as 
weak, inapplicable to Shi‟i school of thought as they only exist in Sunni sources, or that they refer to 
only specific cases of female leadership (from particular contexts), and should not be considered as 
universal Islamic rulings on female authority, applicable for all times and contexts [3,43].  
This position departs from the contextual re-reading as it does not emphasize women‟s lack of 
qualifications, but rather puts the blame on clerical misinterpretations that declared women unfit to 
rule. Hence, this stance, as articulated by reformists such as Yusuf Saanei, Mehdi Mehrizi and Salehi 




Najaf Abady, emphasize clerical misinterpretations that unjustly hinder women‟s access to positions of 
power and ignored religious principles of gender equality. The implication of this latter stance is that 
by merely acknowledging clerical misinterpretation in the past, it undermines the clerical legitimacy 
and authority over interpretations and in a way democratizes religious interpretation. Such 
democratization is significant in terms of future interpretations and legal shifts that will unfold in the 
Iranian context, as it acknowledges the ulema’s possibilities for error and hence undermines the 
immutability of religious rulings. Additionally, the feminist re-reading approach enables multiplicity 
of voices, including women‟s own voices in religious interpretation, which has been a central demand 
of many pious Iranian women. Hence, I argue that the debate on women‟s rights and their access to 
position of authority is a process. While women initially objected to their exclusion from political 
leadership by emphasizing lack of consensus among the clerics and strategically publicized the most 
liberal clerical voices, today they demand to be part of the interpretation process. In this regard, 
Ayatollah Saanei is considered a significant figure in helping secure women‟s role in religious 
interpretation, and is therefore continuously lobbied and pressured by various pious women‟s rights 
groups. However, the process of establishing Iranian women‟s political and religious authority within 
the Islamic republic remains incomplete. Many pious female activists continue to refer to and publicize 
religious interpretations of male clerics, such as Saanei, rather than a female interpreter, since his 
words as a marja are acceptable to a wider audience and hence more effective given Iran‟s current 
political and social context.  
It is noteworthy to also include that, while a majority of the reformist figures in modern Iran are 
battling out their opposing strategies of addressing women‟s under-representation in leadership, a third 
alternative (mostly non-clerical) approach has also come to light in recent years, which presents itself 
as the most pragmatic, and as a result is championed by many women‟s rights activists, both religious 
and secular. This latter approach is considered conciliatory between the two previous positions as it 
moves away from the language of sound or erroneous clerical interpretations. In an effort to solve the 
problem of women‟s inefficiencies for most positions of authority in modern Iran, particularly those 
that list as qualifications aspects of religious authority that have traditionally been closed to women, 
this approach emphasizes the administrative role of most political leadership positions. In other words, 
this approach argues that constitutionally required religious qualifications such as being a mujtahid, 
mufti, faqih, or even rijal for political leadership positions should not bar women from accessing them, 
since in the modern state such positions require implementation of specific laws, rulings, or 
responsibilities [9]. Similar to other reformist positions, this approach was sought due to extensive 
pressuring from various Iranian women‟s rights activists who viewed such limitations of religious 
authority as discriminatory towards women‟s access to politics.  
5. Conclusions 
In this work I illustrated that the recent rise in reformist Shi‟i ideology regarding female authority is 
in a large part due to women‟s activism and pressuring of Iranian religious and political elites. 
Particularly, within the last decade we have witnessed a shift in Shi‟i clerical discourse from the 
conventional stance that banned women‟s access to decision-making positions based on traditional 
interpretations that limited women to the private sphere. Different groups of women‟s demands for 




further presence in politics challenged the historical male dominance over the political sphere, as well 
as the religious elites who maintained such male privilege through their traditional interpretations and 
implementations of religious texts. Today, the clerics no longer have the comfort of passing rulings 
about an abstract notion of woman since they are faced with intelligent and capable women that 
demand reform of male-dominated rulings from within a religious framework. Today, women no 
longer accept that God had ordained that men should rule over women. In this regard, the religious 
women‟s movement in Iran which is often led by renowned learned women who themselves were 
inspired and nurtured by the Islamic regime and its revolutionary ideals, has been at the forefront of 
championing such changes and opening avenues for women‟s political representation.  
A central strategy of the Iranian women‟s movements was to involve the religious leaders into a 
dialogue. Once their demands were voiced to the ulema, they strategically publicized the exchanges 
between women‟s organizations and state or religious officials in women‟s journals in an effort to 
popularize and legitimize the issue of women‟s access to political decision-making. This tactic was 
considered the first step towards reform of patriarchal interpretations, as it forced the clerics to review 
Islamic texts in response to women‟s demands, particularly since such demands were often voiced by 
pious women who were also devoted to the Islamic regime. Women‟s success in publicizing such 
debates and their influence over public opinion illustrates their leverage over state officials, who were 
forced to be responsive to women‟s demands for greater political representation as they depend on 
public legitimacy and women‟s vote to stay in power. By reviewing and closely analyzing the strategic 
interactions that have been recently taking place in women‟s journals or other media outlets, this work 
not only shed light onto the nature of women‟s strategizing and the regime‟s reactions, but also 
recognized two dominant categories of reformist justification for their support for women‟s access to 
leadership positions in modern times.  
This paper argued that reformist rereading on this subject falls into the categories of contextual or 
feminist. While the contextual rereading emphasizes changes in today‟s context and culture as a 
justification for increasing women‟s access to positions of authority, the feminist rereading rather 
emphasizes correction of conventional clerical misinterpretation and patriarchy that limited women‟s 
access to politics. I argue that recognition of these subtle differences and distinction between these 
types of religious reform is important as each has a different implication for women and the future 
prospects of reform in the society. Particularly, this work examined the extent to which each of these 
reformist positions democratize religious interpretation, and recognized that a feminist rereading 
enables multiplicity of voices in religious reform as it can undermine the authenticity of many male 
clerics, who erred in their conventional interpretation. Indeed, although disagreement (ikhtilaf) among 
the ulema is permitted and even expected in Muslim jurisprudence, this feature is often problematic 
within the Iranian theocratic system. This is because Iran‟s laws are largely shaped by a small minority 
of conservative clerics, who take every measure to maintain their clerical monopoly over the legal 
system and ultimately the authority of the government. Therefore, a reformist agenda that 
democratizes religious interpretation, such as by granting interpretative power even to lay intellectuals, 
can have important impacts on the country‟s laws. However, I argue that although there is a demand 
for feminist centered re-reading and re-interpretations of religious texts, the current dominant Shi‟i 
reformism still maintains its monopoly on religious interpretation and the process of opening such 
spaces to women is still incomplete. This dominance undermines the possibilities for future 




democratization of religious interpretation in which various voices including non-clerical ones can be 
taken into account.  
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